真理条件とは何か

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  • シンリ ジョウケン トワ ナニ カ

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説明

The notion of truth conditions of sentences or psychological states plays important roles in various areas of philosophy, but authors who appeal to this notion rarely explain exactly what attribute of those entities truth conditions are. Indeed, there are two notions (not always clearly distinguished) that can legitimately be called the notions of truth conditions, and these are definable by reference to different semantical frameworks. It turns out that there is an important systematic relationship between the two notions, explicitly definable within Kaplan's theory of demonstratives, and this reveals that the two kinds of truth conditions are to be attributed to entities of different ontological types.

収録刊行物

  • 科学哲学

    科学哲学 37 (1), 29-42, 2004

    日本科学哲学会

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