Supervenience Thesis and Ontological Commitment
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- Igashira Masahiko
- Osaka University
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
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- スーパーヴィーニエンス・テーゼと存在論的コミットメント
- スーパーヴィーニエンス・テーゼと存在論的コミットメント--物理主義の存在論的含意の把握に向けて
- スーパーヴィーニエンス テーゼ ト ソンザイロンテキ コミットメント ブツリ シュギ ノ ソンザイロンテキ ガンイ ノ ハアク ニ ムケテ
- -物理主義の存在論的含意の把握に向けて-
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Abstract
Although physicalism is usually understood as an ontological thesis, it is not clear that what implications this position has on the matter of ontology expressed by the question “What there is?” In this paper, I begin with Quine's “indispensability argument,” and abstract from it a framework for sorting ontological positions. Then, I try to locate supervenience thesis, which is an important part of physicalism, within the framework above. One conclusion of this paper is that supervenience thesis works, neither as a direct assertion on what there is nor as an assertion on the criterion of ontological commitment we should adopt, but as an assertion on the class of the sentences from which we should extract ontology.
Journal
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- Kagaku tetsugaku
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Kagaku tetsugaku 42 (2), 2_59-2_73, 2009
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390282680060921728
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- NII Article ID
- 130004546717
- 120006930473
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- NII Book ID
- AN00037482
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- ISSN
- 18836461
- 02893428
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- HANDLE
- 10086/22102
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- NDL BIB ID
- 10557014
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- Text Lang
- en
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
- IRDB
- NDL
- Crossref
- CiNii Articles
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed