Russell’s Paradox and the Theory of Propositional Functions in <i>The Principles of Mathematics</i>

Bibliographic Information

Other Title
  • 『数学の原理』におけるラッセルのパラドクスと命題関数の理論
  • 『 スウガク ノ ゲンリ 』 ニ オケル ラッセル ノ パラドクス ト メイダイ カンスウ ノ リロン

Search this article

Description

Bertrand Russell has found the paradox that bears his own name in the spring of 1901 and offered a version of the so-called “simple” theory of types as measures against it in an appendix to The Principles of Mathematics (1903). This theory was devised to deal with the class-version of that paradox. But he formulated it also in terms of “predicates” and the type theory has no effect to this formulation. In this paper, I shall show that Russell offered measures also against the “predicate”-version of that paradox in the Principles and it is very interesting in a sense that it enables to avoid the paradox without forbidding self-predications of predicates in general.

Journal

  • Kagaku tetsugaku

    Kagaku tetsugaku 46 (1), 17-33, 2012

    The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

References(13)*help

See more

Details 詳細情報について

Report a problem

Back to top