Aesthetic Properties and Perceptual Proof

DOI Web Site Web Site 16 References

Bibliographic Information

Other Title
  • 美的性質と知覚的証明
  • ビテキ セイシツ ト チカクテキ ショウメイ

Search this article

Abstract

    According to the Sibleyan account, descriptive aesthetic judgments are warranted by aesthetic perception. I defend this account by using a philosophical theory of perceptual experience, that is, Fregean intentionalism. I will then suggest an anti-realistic account of aesthetic properties, which claims that perceivable aesthetic properties are not realistic properties supervening on sets of non-aesthetic sensible properties (e.g. color, shape, etc.） of objects, but some kind of “modes of presentation” of such properties. Proving this argument, I demonstrate how the philosophy of perception can be useful for considering problems in aesthetics.

Journal

  • Kagaku tetsugaku

    Kagaku tetsugaku 47 (2), 87-103, 2014

    The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

References(16)*help

See more

Details 詳細情報について

Report a problem

Back to top