Are Negotiators Hawkish or Moderate? :

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Bibliographic Information

Other Title
  • 交渉者はタカ派か中道か
  • ―「二層ゲーム」における交渉者選択過程―
  • Negotiator Selection in Two-Level Games

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Abstract

     The theory of two-level games seeks to integrate the models of international negotiations and domestic policymaking processes, and the existing literature has devoted its attention to the process of “ratification” as a mechanism of transmitting the preferences of domestic actors onto the contents of international agreements. However, selection of negotiators by domestic actors prior to negotiations can serve the same purpose. This article analyzes how domestic preferences affect international agreements through negotiator selection by combining a modified Downsian model and the Rubinstein bargaining model. According to this model, median voters may, under some restricted circumstances, prefer a hawkish to a moderate negotiator in order to enhance the country's bargaining power. The model clarifies the necessary conditions for such a “counter-intuitive” outcome to occur.

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Details 詳細情報について

  • CRID
    1390282680141946624
  • NII Article ID
    110000512108
  • NII Book ID
    AN10096921
  • DOI
    10.11218/ojjams.9.3
  • ISSN
    18816495
    09131442
  • Text Lang
    ja
  • Data Source
    • JaLC
    • CiNii Articles
  • Abstract License Flag
    Disallowed

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