Self-punishment and Internalization of Social Norms:

DOI Web Site

Bibliographic Information

Other Title
  • 繰り返しゲームにおける社会規範の内面化と自己制裁：
  • 繰り返しゲームにおける社会規範の内面化と自己制裁 : 規範に従う心
  • クリカエシ ゲーム ニ オケル シャカイ キハン ノ ナイメンカ ト ジコ セイサイ : キハン ニ シタガウ ココロ
  • 規範に従う心
  • The Mind Following Norms

Search this article

Abstract

<p>Self-sanction in the repeated norm enforcing game is analyzed in order to analyze norm internalization of rational actors. Self-sanction is costly punishment which is carried out to self and includes psychological (e.g. conscience and regret), economic (resigning a job), and physical (hurting self) processes. The norm with self-punishment strategy equilibrium is characterized, and both self-sanction and external-sanction which is carried out by other players are considered. The equilibrium is sustained even when the social norm brings inefficient outcome. We obtained following results. Firstly, the equilibrium is sustained in wider setting of parameters when self-sanction is planned. Secondly, social norm in N-prisoners’ dilemma setting can be sustained without external-sanction. Lastly, key mechanism sustaining inefficient norms is not self-sanction but external one.</p>

Journal

Related Projects

See more

Keywords

Details 詳細情報について

Report a problem

Back to top