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- SHICHIJO Tatsuhiro
- Osaka Prefecture University
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
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- 文化進化系進化ゲーム理論による社会的ジレンマ分析
- ブンカ シンカケイ シンカ ゲーム リロン ニ ヨル シャカイテキ ジレンマ ブンセキ
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Description
There exists three categories in evolutionary game theory, evolutionary game theory of biology, that of economics, and that of cultural evolution. Evolutionary game theory of cultural evolution derives from evolutionary game theory of economics. In that of economics, they suppose strategy which earn better payoff would spread in the group. But, evolutionary game theory of cultural evolution can treat the situation in which the supposition isn't satisfied. It can treat the case in which there exists frequency dependent bias and effect of strategy manifestation. In this paper, we use this two situations to construct models which explain origin of corporation in social dilemma. One of these models, we show corporation can spread in social dilemma situation, even if it is not repeated game.
Journal
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- Sociological Theory and Methods
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Sociological Theory and Methods 18 (2), 169-183, 2003
Japanese Association For Mathematical Sociology
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390282680143472256
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- NII Article ID
- 110000511891
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- NII Book ID
- AN10096921
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- ISSN
- 18816495
- 09131442
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- NDL BIB ID
- 6744511
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- Text Lang
- ja
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- Article Type
- journal article
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
- NDL Search
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed