Bayesianism, Ravens, and Evidential Relevance
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- PENNOCK Robert T.
- Lyman Briggs School of Science and Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University
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Abstract
Bayesian confirmation theorists have proposed a variety of solutions to Hempel's paradox of the ravens. I examine those of Suppes and Horwich and argue that they do not completely avoid counter-intuitive results about the relevance of data. The Bayesian explication of evidential relevance is also susceptible to the same relevance problems that infect Hypothetico-Deductivism. I explore a possible escape to the problem of old evidence, but conclude that it only leads to problems of the same sort-any datum can be relevant to any hypothesis in any circumstance. I argue that the Bayesian evidence relation is not sufficient or necessary to determine what counts as evidence. Such difficulties warrant pursuit of alternative explications of evidential relevance. I show how the raven's paradox may be avoided by bringing in causal considerations.
Journal
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- Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
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Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 13 (1), 1-26, 2004
Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
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Keywords
Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390282680248750208
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- NII Article ID
- 110007033691
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- NII Book ID
- AA00026247
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- ISSN
- 18841228
- 04530691
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- MRID
- 2183059
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- Text Lang
- en
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
- Crossref
- CiNii Articles
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed