Revisiting the Problem of Political Obligation

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  • 政治的責務論再考
  • セイジテキ セキムロン サイコウ トウチシャ ニ タイスル ケイジョウ ト シテノ セイトウセイ

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Why should subjects defer to and obey their ruler? This question which is taken seriously especially by civil disobedients, coustitutes the core of the problem of legitimacy, and inquiries of the answer to the question has been mainly done in the theories of political obligation. But standard theories of political obligation have not given enough attention to the moral character of vertical relationship between ruler and subjects and the basis of intrinsic value of the latter's deference to the former. Arguments from fairness regard the state as a social cooperation between the equal members, and as an instrument to supply goods indispensable for us, so they do not adequately recognize the intrinsic value of deference. One of the arguments from natural duty of justice appeals the needs of political institutions which administer stably in a specific territory the principles of justice, but they attach little importance to how the relation between ruler and subjects has formed, and how subjects consider that their ruler believes in good faith that his judgment is just. The reasons for ruler to care about the basis of his political authority and the reasons for subjects to take seriously the basis of their political obligation are essentially different, and we should treat them separately. But in spite of the difference, to the virtue of ruler who presents consistently his understanding of the common goods, subjects have a (strong) reason to defer because in his claim of consistency, ruler has to be open and accountable to dissentients who blame him for inconsistency.

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