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Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
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- 世襲議員の実証分析
- セシュウ ギイン ノ ジッショウ ブンセキ
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Description
Dynastic politicians, who are defined as those whose family members have also served for the same position in the past, occupy a sizable portion of political offices in Japan. We analyze how dynastic politicians with inherited advantages differ from non-dynastic politicians, and how they affect electoral policy choices on distributive benefits. Specifically, we ask (1) if there exists any significant difference in background characteristics between dynastic and non-dynastic legislators and (2) if there exists any significant difference in the amount of fiscal transfer from the national to the local government between districts with and without dynastic legislators. Our analysis, using panel data between 1997 and 2007, shows that dynastic politicians have more electoral resources, are more likely to win elections, and bring more subsidies to their constituencies than non-dynastic politicians.
Journal
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- Japanese Journal of Electoral Studies
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Japanese Journal of Electoral Studies 26 (2), 139-153, 2011
Japanese Association of Electoral Studies
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390282680279915904
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- NII Article ID
- 130005697096
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- NII Book ID
- AN10035687
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- ISSN
- 18840353
- 09123512
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- NDL BIB ID
- 11017908
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- Text Lang
- ja
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
- NDL Search
- CiNii Articles
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed