Can Adaptively Rational Voters Control Public Policies? : Computational Extension of Outcome-Oriented Voting
書誌事項
- タイトル別名
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- Can Adaptively Rational Voters Control Public Policies?
- Computational Extension of Outcome - Oriented Voting
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According to the Downsian Median Voter Theorem, voters can control two competing parties in order to achieve an optimal policy outcome. However, compared with real party politics, there are several restrictive conditions in the classical Downsian spatial model. In this paper, we investigate whether voters can control public policies when the outcomes are weighted sum of positions of two parties. In addition, voters are adaptively rational in the sense that they mainly determine their vote just by observing policy outcomes. Our experiments reveal that voters can control public policies if they can abstain and show the frustration toward both parties.
収録刊行物
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- 選挙研究
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選挙研究 28 (2), 40-50, 2012
日本選挙学会
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390282680279964416
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- NII論文ID
- 130006107479
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- NII書誌ID
- AN10035687
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- ISSN
- 18840353
- 09123512
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- NDL書誌ID
- 024253716
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- データソース種別
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- JaLC
- NDL
- CiNii Articles
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- 抄録ライセンスフラグ
- 使用不可