Aristotle's Definitions of <I>Psyché</I> and Hylomorphism

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Bibliographic Information

Other Title
  • 生命の定義と質料形相論
  • アリストテレス『デ・アニマ』B巻第一、二章の問題

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Description

Regarding Aristotle's hylomorphism in De Anima, J. Ackrill raised a question about matter of living things. His point is that it is a crucial problem whether the matter or body of a living thing is contingently related to its form or Psyché, or is 'already' necessarily living as the homonymy principle suggests. We can see what is wrong with Ackrill's interpretation if we see how Aristotle uses the homonymy principle as for living things. Indeed, the homonymy principle is applied not to matter but to the composite of form and matter. So, the homonymy principle should not be applied to “a natural body which has organs” (412b5-6) which refers to the matter of a living thing. This concludes my arguement that Ackrill's interpretation appears to assume a kind of materialism opposed to Aristotle's hylomorphism.

Journal

  • Philosophy (Tetsugaku)

    Philosophy (Tetsugaku) 1998 (49), 169-179, 1998-05-01

    The Philosophical Association of Japan

Details 詳細情報について

  • CRID
    1390282680298584448
  • NII Article ID
    130003661331
  • DOI
    10.11439/philosophy1952.1998.169
  • ISSN
    18842380
    03873358
  • Data Source
    • JaLC
    • CiNii Articles
  • Abstract License Flag
    Disallowed

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