ピュロン主義とアカデメイア派との相違について

DOI

書誌事項

タイトル別名
  • Scepticism as inquiry
  • Pyrrhonism and the New Academy
  • 「把握不可能性」の主張と「探求」概念を手掛かりに

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説明

The New Academy is characterized by two features: a thesis, viz. that all things are incognitive (henceforth I), and a recommendation, viz. that we should suspend judgement about them (henceforth S).<BR>According to Sextus, New Academics make the affirmation, whereas Pyrrhonists only announce I as their own state of mind. But Sextus does not include Arcesilaus in New Academy and says "Arcesilaus certainly seems to me to have something in common with what the Pyrrhonists say" (PH 1. 232). Moreover, Sextus does not argue against Arcesilaus' notion "eulogon(the reasonable)". The point I want to make is that Carneades' notion "pithanon(the plausible)" played an important role in weakening Scepticism. Through this notion, I was affirmed as the New Academics' own position and S was modified. The pithanon as "supremely perfect judgement" (M 7. 181)ruled out persisting in inquiry, which is a definitive feature of Pyrrhonism.

収録刊行物

  • 哲学

    哲学 2002 (53), 177-187,244, 2002-04-01

    日本哲学会

詳細情報 詳細情報について

  • CRID
    1390282680298718208
  • NII論文ID
    130003661410
  • DOI
    10.11439/philosophy1952.2002.177
  • ISSN
    18842380
    03873358
  • データソース種別
    • JaLC
    • CiNii Articles
  • 抄録ライセンスフラグ
    使用不可

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