How Does Contextualism Solve the Skeptical Paradox?
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- YAMADA Keiichi
- Tohoku University
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
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- 懐疑論のパラドクスを文脈主義によって解決する方法
- カイギロン ノ パラドクス オ ブンミャク シュギ ニ ヨッテ カイケツスル ホウホウ
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Description
Epistemological contextualism holds that the truth-conditions of knowledge-attributing sentences depend on the contexts in which they are uttered. While Contextualists have presented solutions of the skeptical paradox with reference to this dependence, they are confronted with various criticisms. In this paper, I examine DeRose's solution of skepticism, and then elucidate why it fails to do justice to the persuasiveness of skeptical argument. Finally, as an alternative resolution of radical skepticism, I suggest the position of “radical contextualism” that claims not only standards of knowledge but of epistemic distinction (justification) depend on the context, and illustrate the justification model of radical contextualism in contrast with that of radical skepticism.
Journal
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- Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
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Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 34 (1), 11-20, 2007
Japan Association for Philosophy of Science
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390282680300468224
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- NII Article ID
- 10018919370
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- NII Book ID
- AN00036945
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- ISSN
- 18841236
- 00227668
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- NDL BIB ID
- 8838026
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- Text Lang
- ja
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
- NDL
- Crossref
- CiNii Articles
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed