現象学は外在主義から何を学べるか

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タイトル別名
  • What can Phenomenology learn from the externalist insight?
  • ゲンショウガク ワ ガイザイ シュギ カラ ナニ オ マナベル カ

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<p>The internalism/externalism debate is one of the most important issues discussed in such areas of contemporary philosophy as philosophy of language, philosophy of mind (philosophy of thought), and epistemology. Husserl’s phenomenology might also be regarded as a kind of internalism since it emphasizes its methodological reduction into the internal sphere of experiences (“phenomenological reduction”). Externalist criticisms against some naive forms of internalist prejudice, however, seem to contain some important insights concerning the concepts of meaning, knowledge, and mental content (or propositional attitudes). Therefore I would like to try to defend Husserl’s basic insight concerning the concept of meaning, by adjusting it to accommodate this externalist insight. This “adjusting”, however, is not a distortion of Husserl’s original philosophy. I believe that it is just a precise explication of Husserl’s own insight as it really is.</p><p>In order to show this, I will try to survey the early Husserl’s theory of meaning first, bringing out its internalistic features. Secondly, I introduce a kind of externalist criticism relevant to the theory. Thirdly, I would like to try to reconcile them, focusing on the contextuality of experience. Then, finally, I will consider the objectivity of scientific knowledge. I will argue that Husserl can accept the contextualityof meaning from the viewpoint of the contextuality of experience, in a way which does not destroy the objectivity of scientific knowledge.</p>

収録刊行物

  • 哲学

    哲学 2017 (68), 155-168, 2017

    日本哲学会

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