定義はどのようにして構成されるか

My aim in this paper is to make clear how a definition is constructed according to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B. 10. In this chapter, Aristotle explains how and how many definitions (horismos) are employed in his theory of inquiry, and grounds his analysis in the concept of horos. On my view, horos and horismos are different terms concerning definition, although both have been usually translated as ‘definition’.<br>I maintain that horos and horismos have each three features, as can be brought out by rendering one type of horos as (D1) ‘a name-like phrase’ (a phrase which signifies a thing). Based mainly on this interpretation, I claim that horos is the defining component which constructs an appropriate horismos, and that horismos is the practice of definition as providing an account of ‘what the thing is’.<br>A central reason for distinguishing the terms is the difference between the unity conditions of horos and horismos; while the former is a unity by being stitched together, the latter is a unity by revealing one thing of one thing (93b35-7). Moreover, we can find the same component (horos) both in the answer to the ‘what is it?’ question (e. g. ‘the noise of fire being quenched in the clouds’), and in the answer to the ‘why is it?’ question (‘because the fire is quenched in the clouds’). In these examples, another type of horos as (D2) ‘an account which provides an answer to the “why is it?” question’ yields the basis of causal definition and shows us the cause of the existence of the thing. A third type of horos (such as ‘noise in the clouds’) can be characterized as (D3) ‘the conclusion of a demonstration of what something is’, which requires our grasp of the existence of the thing in horismos (93b38-94a10). In this way, we can understand how the one cause reveals the unity of horismos.