The Okinawa Reversion and the U.S.-Japan Security Dialogue: Revision of the Political Aspects of Alliance Asymmetry

This study aims to clarify the process of the Okinawa reversion in 1969 with regard to the establishment of “asymmetry,” which has been regarded as a special feature of U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation. The mutual acceptance of asymmetric cooperation between the two countries can be evinced by examining the security dialogue on the status of Okinawa and bilateral security cooperation after reversion. Asymmetry in the alliance, which is considered a fundamental problem in U.S.-Japan cooperation, became a structural feature of the alliance in the reversion negotiations.<br> To analyze the process of acceptance of asymmetric cooperation between the U.S. and Japan, this study utilizes James D. Morrow’s “arms vs. ally” model. This model presents an alternative explanation for nations’ willingness to form alliances in the face of a common threat. For a nation to enhance its security, there are two main options: to ally with another state or to develop armament. This decision is made based on calculations of the domestic/external costs and benefits. The perspectives of Japan and the U.S. on Okinawa’s status after the reversion clashed during the negotiations, with Japan desiring the denuclearization of Okinawa and across-the-board application of the prior consultation system articulated in Article 6 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The United States, for its part, wished to ensure freedom of military operation in Okinawa after reversion. The two countries carried out their negotiations based on consideration of their internal and external circumstances. As a result, the reversion of Okinawa enhanced alliance cooperation, which in turn signified a new Japanese security presence in East Asia. The Korean clause in the Sato-Nixon Communiqué was a consequence of the calculations of the two countries and delineated some of Japan’s increasing responsibilities in alliance cooperation. This served to deepen asymmetric cooperation rather than mitigate it. The Korean clause brought about the political elimination of asymmetry in the alliance even though the substance of asymmetric cooperation remained unresolved. Nevertheless, this represented a rational solution, considering the two countries’ contradictory demands and respective circumstances.<br> In analyzing this process, this study clarifies the significance of the Okinawa reversion through the alliance model. Unlike most states, Japan has emphasized alliance cooperation as a means of enhancing her security. This factor has been influenced by the uniqueness of Japan’s foreign policy, which is formed within the bounds of the U.S-Japan Security Treaty and its Peace Constitution.