DECISION AND LEARNING OF THE HUMAN SUBJECTS IN THE CENTIPEDE GAMES USING AGENT-BASED SIMULATION

DOI Web Site Web Site 25 References

Bibliographic Information

Other Title
  • エージェントベースシミュレーションを用いたムカデゲームにおける被験者の意思決定および学習に関する分析
  • エージェントベースシミュレーション オ モチイタ ムカデゲーム ニ オケル ヒケンシャ ノ イシ ケッテイ オヨビ ガクシュウ ニ カンスル ブンセキ

Search this article

Abstract

A subgame perfect equilibrium is known as that predicts human behavior in the games in extensive form with a high degree of accuracy. However, some experimental results of the centipede game, one of the games in extensive form, such that human subjects deviate from the equilibrium behavior are reported. It is assumed the players are rational in the sense that payoff maximization in the equilibrium theory. From the fact that the games are repeated in the laboratory experiments, it can be thought that the human subjects make decisions not for maximizing the payoff on a single game, but cumulative payoff which the subjects obtain in multiple games in the experiments. This paper shows that the long-term view for cumulative payoff maximization, asymmetry property of subjects, and the risk attitude for the payoffs can explain the behavior of the subjects in the centipede games through simulation using artificial adaptive agents.

Journal

References(25)*help

See more

Keywords

Details 詳細情報について

Report a problem

Back to top