Aristotle's Distinction between Energeia and Kinesis

<p>In this paper, I consider whether Aristotle's distinction between energeia and kinesis is justified, through examining some scholar's challenges against this distinction. In Metaphysics 6 6, Aristotle draws a distinction between energeia and kinesis(1048b18-35) ; the kind of actions whose descriptions can contain compatibly both present tense verb and perfect tense verb is energeia. Its paradigm case is "seeing"(We can say that one is seeing and has seen at the same time). On the other hand, the kind of actions whose descriptions cannot contain compatibly both present tense verb and perfect tense verb is kinesis. Its paradigm case is "house-building"(We cannot say that one is house-building and has house-built at the same time). Besides this distinction, Aristotle characterises kinesis as an energeia in a wide sense, i. e., an actuality as opposed to potentiality. This is because the relation of the potentiality of kinesis to the actual kinesis is analogically regarded to be equivalent with the relation of potentiality to actuality. Kineseis, however, are incomplete as they are shown in the former tense distinction, because they are transitive processes as yet to be directed to their proper ends and limits. Therefore, while the energeia simpliciter in which the end is present is complete in each moment, kinesis, being a kind of energeia, is incomplete. In short, the principle of the distinction is the contrast between completeness of energeia and incompleteness of kinesis. In order to avoid confusion, I here employ the word "energeia" to signify energeia in the narrow sense, which is distinguished from kinesis, and employ the word "actuality" to signify energeia in the wider sense, which can subsume both the category of kinesis and the one of energeia. J. L. Ackrill challenged against the validity of Aristotelian distinction by raising the following two questions.(1)While we can say that one is seeing and has seen at the same time, it would not be true that one is seeing a movie and has seen a movie at the same time. Then, is it the case that "seeing a movie" is a kinesis?(2)While we can not say that one is house-building and has house-built at the same time, it would be true to say that he is exercising his faculty and has exercised his faculty at the same time. Then, with respect to one's exercising faculty, is it the case that house-building is an energeia? T. Penner has proposed "two-entity theory" as his solution on this issue, by examining Ackrill's challenge. "Two-entity theory" involves two constituents in describing e.g. "seeing a movie" such that "seeing a movie" consists of both "seeing" which is an energeia and "the movie" which is a kinesis. Likewise, "house-building" consists of both house-builder's exercising his faculty which is an energeia and his bodily movement which is a kinesis. To examine Penner's proposal, we should look at De Anima B 6 and Physics Γ 1-3. Firstly, Aristotle distinguishes three types of perceptible objects in De Anima B 6, among of which the relevant case for our purpose is the proper perceptible object. This type of object is characterised to be perceptible "in itself" and "special" to the particular sense faculty. As for seeing, sight's proper object is colour. Moreover, according to the passages 425b26-28, 426a15-16, the actuality of the sensible object is one and the same with the actuality of the sense. Thus, the actuality of one's capable of seeing is one and the same with that of visible thing. That is, two distinct potential beings give rise to one and the same actuality. And that one and the same actuality, i.e., seeing is an energeia due to its completeness. On the other hand, "seeing a movie" is not entitled to be treated as one and the</p><p>(View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)</p>