Passage 859 c to 864 b in the ninth book of the Laws presents a quite elaborate discussion of the causes of crime, in which Plato introduces the Socratic paradox "No one does wrong willingly" The discussion is usually interpreted as being Plato's most deliberate consideration of the relevance of the paradox to the penal code that is to be enacted in the ninth book Nonetheless, it is true that the paradox apparently contradicts a penal code in which decisions are determined by whether or not a crime is voluntary or involuntary The paradox seems to deny the possibility of voluntary crime, for "No one does wrong willingly" clearly implies that no injustice will be done voluntarily This suggests that some new understanding of crime is required if the paradox is to be accepted But is this the real point on which Plato sets his eyes in the vexed passage ? In this paper, alternative explanations are sought employing the ingenious criticism in the commentary of T J Saunders The following two points are at issue First, passage 864 a 1-8 is explained by Saunders as rerernng to αγνοια "however remotely" Is this the point that Plato has in mind? Second, Saunders argues that passage 863 a 5-6 requires a distinction between two senses, εκουσιον and ακουσιον, i e a Socratic and ordinary sense, and that this distinction is provided in passage 863 e 2-3 Is this also Plato's point? The alternative interpretation to the first problem derives from the fact that no need exists to read the reference to αγνοια into the discussion of the passage An act guided by η του αριστου δοξα is carefully distinguished by Plato from αδικια and said to be a βλαβη even if it happens to be committed without any fault What Plato wants to say in the last sentence of the passage is that the act can never be called αδικια, whether one names it ακουσιον or not This careful distinction seems to reject the αγνοια-referred interpretation of Saunders The answer to the second problem regarding the requirement made in the passage in question that acts of εκουσιον and ακουσιον in the ordinary sense are involved in the previous discussion from 861 e 6 to 863 a 2 (and not a distinction between the two senses, Socratic and ordinary), is found in the two successive clauses contained in passage 863 e 5-864 a 8 That is to say, "whether some damage may be done or not" (863 e 8) can be said to refer to εκουσιον and ακουσιον in the ordinary sense, and "even if some fault may be committed" to ακουσιον If this interpretation is to the point, we can argue that it is not the solution of the contradictory relevance of the Socratic paradox to the assumptions of the penal code that Plato intends to bring forth Rather, what Plato tries to make clear is the public superficial recognition of justice and injustice, his claim that they are only to be sought as a state of mind, and his firm decision that legislation, practical as it is, must set its eye on this ideal definition of justice and injustice This is the very paradox that has to be solved by Plato