Aristotle's Conception of Philosophy in the Pyotrepticus : Comparison with Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle himself in his Later Treatises

Although Aristotle's view in the Protr. on the nature of philosophy may, generally speaking, be called anti-Isocratic and Platonic in character, this paper, by analysing esp. Frr. 5, 12 and 13, traces Aristotle's real intention in his conception of philosophy as the following: (I) There are two distinct provinces of knowledge (επισγημη=ψρονησιζ) , each of which is different from the other in its function and character, viz., (1) Knowledge that deals with 'nature and the rest of reality' (Fr. 5), i. e. ,'philosophy' (Fr. 13), which is 'theoretical' and 'good' in its proper character (Frr. 12, 13). (2) Knowledge that deals with 'the just and the expedient' or 'the virtue of the soul' (Fr. 5), i. e. 'politics' or 'legislation' (Fr. 13), which is practical and 'useful for our human life' in its proper character (Frr. 12, 13). (II) The relation between (1) and (2) is such that knowledge-(2) requires knowledge- (1) as the basis for its work (cf. προσδεονται ιλοσοψιαζ, Fr. 13) ; the task of knowledge- (2) should be performed 'in accordance with' (κατα) knowledge-(1) ; or the norms by reference to which the task of knowledge- (2) is to be performed should be 'taken from' (απο) nature and truth itself which are the proper objects of knowledge- (1) . The contrast, then, between Aristotle's position in the Protr. and those of Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle himself in his later treatises may be described as follows: (A) The difference from Isocrates will be obvious to every interpreter since he confines the task of philosophy to the realm of (2) which he thinks can be grasped only as 'doxa' (not as 'knowledge'). (B) While Aristotle in his later years (Eth. Nic. Bks. Z, K, etc.) comes to make a sharp separation of the province of (2) (which alone is called ψρονησιζ and concerned with that which is contingent) from that of (1) (which is called επιστημη and concerned with that which is necessary), he in the Proty. is still making (2) related to (1) (by κατα, απο etc.) and using the term ψρονησιζ to cover both. This must be called a radical difference in the sense that Jaeger once argued. (C) The relationship between the two kinds of knowledge, (meta) physical (1) and ethical (2), may seem to reflect a Platonic character; but in fact it involves an entirely un-Platonic distinction, the distinction, that is, between the good (αγαθον)belonging to theoretical knowledge and the useful (ωψελιμον, χρησιμον) belonging to practical knowledge. And, whereas for Plato Being and Value, knowledge and action, coalesce in the contemplation of the Forms, so that knowledge- (1) is at the same time knowledge- (2), Aristotle in the Protr. is virtually thinking of knowledge- (1) as the proper function of human intellect, of which knowledge- (2) is only secondary and derivative and can in consequence be dispensed with in certain conditions. This difference of thought, which again must surely be considered a radical one, is strikingly shown by comparing two philosophers' descriptions of the state of pure bliss in an ideal life: the life of the gods in 'the place beyond the heavens' (Phaedrus 247 AB) and the life of the inhabitants of 'the Isles of the Blest' (Protr. Fr. 12). In the former passage the Forms of ethical virtue such as 'Justice' and 'Temperance' are mentioned as ones which nourish and prosper the souls of the gods, but in the latter it is said that all the ethical virtues are not present since they are no longer needed and there remains nothing but theoretical knowledge- (1). In submitting these points the present writer departs significantly from the views of I. During, E. de Strycker, S. Mansion, and J. D. Monan as well as W. Jaeger.