Το ον, Ταυτον and Θατερον in the Sophist 251-9

MORI Shunyo

doi:10.20578/jclst.18.0_52

It would be very reasonable to expect that the theory of the κοινωια between Forms would clarify the real structure of the whole domain of Forms and would enable us to reconsturct it by means of dialectic. In the Sophist 251-9, however, Forms are divided into two groups, τα μεν κοιννειν, τα δε μη and τα δια παντων τοι&b.sigmav; πασι κεκοινωνηκεναι; and the discussion is chiefly concerned with the κοινωνια of the latter which are sub-divided into το ον, ταυτον and θατερον, and are distinctly marked out by the combined use of δια παντων with the perfect tense. I believe that these three lie on a different level from other ordinary Forms since the φυσι&b.sigmav; of each of the three has taken part in all the Forms. This difference of level is, I think, found in Plato's exemplification of several pairs of opposite Forms, ουκ εστιν…and εστιν…where the five Forms, κινησι&b.sigmav; and στααι&b.sigmav; (which belong to the group of τα μεν and τα δε μη) and the three mentioned above are applied (255 e-259 b). Mr. Ackrill (in his Plato and the Copula) asserts that Plato here analysed and distinguished three uses of εστιν: εστιν meaning existence, εστιν meaning identity, and εστιν as the copula. But his premise that the statement 'το Α μετεχει του Β' is equivalent with the ordinary attributive statement 'Α εστι Β' is hardly convincing, especially in view of the arguments of this part of the Sophist. The κοινωνια such as that of genus with species is a sort of communication between Forms of τα μεν and τα δε μη. What Plato is concerned with at present, however, is the more fundamental one. Θατερον, for example, is prior to εναντια and thus it contributes to the χωρισμο&b.sigmav; between any two Forms in the manner of προ&b.sigmav; ετερον. Ταυτον, on the other hand, contributes to it in the manner of προ&b.sigmav; εαυτον; and together with θατερον ταυτον secures the self-identity of every Form. Lastly, if the χωρισμο&b.sigmav; means το χωρι&b.sigmav; ειναι, then το ον secures the ειναι itself. Therefore, το ον, ταυτον and θατερον, provide the basis of self-identical existence for every Form. By the 'difference of level' I do not mean that there must be some formal concepts like existence or copula whose logical function in a proposition is essentially distinct from other ordinary concepts, but that every Form must acquire sufficient ontological assurance before all the communications of Forms are brought to light and the infallible knowledge of Forms comes into our possession.

Το ον, Ταυτον and Θατερον in the Sophist 251-9

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