OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF FIRMS IN SOUTH KOREA AS AN EMERGING MARKET COUNTRY : FOCUS ON A CASE STUDY OF SAMSUNG ZAIBATSU IN SOUTH KOREA

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  • Kim Jae-suk
    日本大学大学院経済学研究科博士後期課程

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  • 新興市場国としての韓国における企業の所有構造と企業統治 : 韓国サムスン財閥の事例を中心として
  • シンコウ シジョウコク ト シテ ノ カンコク ニ オケル キギョウ ノ ショユウ コウゾウ ト キギョウ トウチ : カンコク サムスン ザイバツ ノ ジレイ オ チュウシン ト シテ

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Although corporate governance (CG) problems have been studied in advanced countries, the problems have not been studied sufficiently in emerging market countries. However, the concerns with CG problems in emerging market countries have been growing since the financial crisis of 1997. The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of ownership structure on CG of firms in South Korea as an emerging market country, through a case study on Samsung zaibatsu. In this paper, I dealt with matter as follows. The first section of this paper theoretically discusses the relationship between ownership structure and CG; it includes the CG problems in concentrated ownership structure and Korean zaibatsu. In the second section, the nation's CG system and main content of the reform will be treated. In the final section, I showed the characteristics and problems of ownership structure and CG in South Korea through a case study on Samsung zaibatsu. I could obtain the results, as a result of analyzing the above-mentioned problems. First, as for share ownership, rate of share ownership by the controlling families and affiliated firms in Korean zaibatsu remains high level. For this reason, controlling shareholders/owner-managers have kept control power until now. That is, the personal ownership of controlling shareholder has declined while their control through affiliated firms has increased. Second, as for CG, although the reform to improve the CG has been practiced in Korea since 1998, the controlling shareholder and manager of zaibatsu such as Samsung tend to resist and object to it. Consequently, it is show that the reform had no satisfactory effect. Lastly, the central CG problem in Korean of concentrated ownership structure is the monitoring of controlling shareholders/owner-manager's management and the protection of minority shareholders' interest.

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