The limits on the Congressional Power of Rule-Making in the United States : Special Reference to the Constitutionality of House Supermajority Rule

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  • アメリカにおける議院規則制定権の限界 : 増税法案の可決に特別多数を求める連邦下院規則の合憲性
  • アメリカ ニ オケル ギイン キソク セイテイケン ノ ゲンカイ ゾウゼイ ホ

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Abstract

In section 1, constitutional issues of the House supermajority rule are examined. On the opening day of the 104th Congress, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives adopted Rule XXI that requires a three-fifths vote to pass an increase in income tax. In approving this rule, the House relied on its constitutionally delegated power to determine the rules of its proceedings. In section 2, procedual obstacles to a rule challenge are described. Before a decision on the constitutionality of the rule can be reached, two hurdles must be overcome; the doctrine of legislative standing and the doctrine of remedial discretion. This article finds, in this supermajority rule case, that Representatives satisfy standing requirements and that the doctrine of remedial discretion does not act as a bar to judicial review. In section 3, constitutionality of the House supermajority rule is discussed. The principle of majority-rule is so fundamental that the Framers found it unnecessary to explicitly proclaim it in the Constitution. And several provisions of the Constitution support the idea that the Framers intended the majority-rule to govern in all situations besides those specifically enumerated. This article concludes that the majority-rule is a Constitutional norm with which the House cannot interfere.

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