Stick, Carrot, and Cooperation in a Repeated Game：

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  • 繰り返しゲームにおける飴，鞭，協力：
  • 繰り返しゲームにおける飴,鞭,協力 : 非効率および効率的な社会規範の維持における懲罰と褒賞の効果
  • クリカエシ ゲーム ニ オケル アメ,ムチ,キョウリョク : ヒコウリツ オヨビ コウリツテキ ナ シャカイ キハン ノ イジ ニ オケル チョウバツ ト ホウショウ ノ コウカ
  • Inefficient and Efficient Social Norms Sustained by Punishments and Rewards
  • 非効率および効率的な社会規範の維持における懲罰と褒賞の効果

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<p>Costly punishments and rewards are considered as solutions to achieve cooperation in social dilemmas. Meanwhile, they also maintain inefficient norms among long-term social relations. In this research, we investigate the mechanism in which punishments and rewards sustain a behavior in an inefficient norms and cooperation in a social dilemma. Maximum discount factors which support cooperation and inefficient behavior as Sub-game Perfect Equiribria of a repeated game with punishments or/and rewards are compared. Although both punishments and rewards maintain an inefficient norm and cooperation, punishments are more effective either in the case of social dilemma or inefficient norm. Temptation to avoid the cost of punishment arises when a player does not pay the cost of the normative behavior. However, a player is tempted to avoid the cost of reward when s/he performs the normative behavior. Costly rewards provoke overlapped incentives to deviate.</p>

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