書誌事項
- タイトル別名
-
- Optimal Deal Strategies under the Disclosure of the Contract History : The Behavioral Norm in the Society of Autonomous Agents
この論文をさがす
説明
<p>The social sanction mechanism against unfair deals is investigated in a society of autonomous agents. The mechanism is realized by disclosing the contract histories of all the agents. To simulate the situation, each agent is made to engage in the deal equivalent to the "Prisoner's dilemma" problem repetitively, each time changing the other party of the deal. Optimal deal strategies are searched under the condition that the contract records will be disclosed and open to all the agents. Several deal algorithms are taken up, and their behaviors are investigated by matching them under various conditions. Based on the results, the condition for optimal deal strategies of the agents are discussed.</p>
収録刊行物
-
- 人工知能
-
人工知能 10 (2), 271-278, 1995-03-01
一般社団法人 人工知能学会
- Tweet
詳細情報 詳細情報について
-
- CRID
- 1390285697602013056
-
- NII論文ID
- 110002806697
-
- NII書誌ID
- AN10067140
-
- ISSN
- 24358614
- 21882266
-
- 本文言語コード
- ja
-
- データソース種別
-
- JaLC
- CiNii Articles
-
- 抄録ライセンスフラグ
- 使用不可