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- Sakaue Shin
- Keio University
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
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- 廃棄物処理市場と環境汚染賠償責任法――割り当てゲームによる分析――
- ハイキブツ ショリ シジョウ ト カンキョウ オセン バイショウ セキニンホウ ワリアテ ゲーム ニ ヨル ブンセキ
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Abstract
<p>I model a waste disposal market under uncertainty of pollution damage by an assignment game between disposal firms and producers. My purpose is to compare social welfare with regard to responsibility under various legal systems that are supposed to prevent adverse selection or moral hazard. Among legal systems such as the negligence rule, strict liability, extended producer responsibility, and penalty systems, I observe certain advantages of the extended responsibility and the penalty system. I also obtain a condition under which the strict liability or the negligence rule yields higher social welfare than other systems.</p>
Journal
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- Review of Environmental Economics and Policy Studies
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Review of Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 4 (2), 12-23, 2011-09-14
The Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies
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Details 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390287297547581440
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- NII Article ID
- 130007993941
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- NII Book ID
- AA12295687
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- ISSN
- 21882495
- 18823742
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- NDL BIB ID
- 11267874
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- Text Lang
- ja
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
- NDL
- CiNii Articles
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed