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- 伊藤 遼
- 慶應義塾大学・日本学術振興会
書誌事項
- タイトル別名
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- The early Russell's view of the universe as fully describable
説明
<p> A standard interpretation of Bertrand Russell’s early work on logic revolves around the doctrine of the unrestricted variable—the idea that the genuine variable of logic must range over all the objects in the universe. Those who endorse this interpretation view the doctrine as ‘the centerpiece’ of The Principles of Mathematics. My aim in this essay is to examine some of the given and possible grounds for this view. I attempt to show that Russell in that book does not endorse the doctrine as it stands but the idea that there are no objects that cannot, in principle, be fully described—the idea that there is no logical bar to making simply true judgments about objects.</p>
収録刊行物
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- 科学哲学
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科学哲学 53 (2), 25-44, 2021-03-31
日本科学哲学会
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390287540631168640
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- NII論文ID
- 130008009550
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- ISSN
- 18836461
- 02893428
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- 資料種別
- journal article
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- データソース種別
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- JaLC
- Crossref
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN
- OpenAIRE
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- 抄録ライセンスフラグ
- 使用不可