Pre-Electoral Coalitions of Chief Executives, Pork-Barreling, and Legislative Success:

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  • 執政長官の選挙前連合、ポーク・バレリング、立法の成功
  • Evidence from Local Governments in Japan

Abstract

<p>While conventional wisdom holds that popularly elected chief executives (i.e. presidents, governors, etc.) tend to find it hard to achieve their desired policies thorough legislation and likely to face institutional deadlock, recent studies on executive-legislative relations reveal that they can win legislative support by distributing pork to legislators. However, less scholarly attention has been paid to the impact of chief executives’ pre-electoral coalitions on their legislative strategy.</p><p>  Quantitative analysis utilizing data of local governments in Japan from 1991 to 2005 demonstrates that governors backed by larger pre-electoral coalitions spend more on pork targeted at legislators, which in turn reduces the probability of experiencing legislative defeat. Also, the result of causal mediation analysis indicates pork barreling mediates the causal relationship between pre-electoral coalitions of governors and their legislative success.</p>

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