「欧州国家」アメリカの自画像――冷戦終結期の米欧関係とG・H・W・ブッシュ外交の基調――

<p>In the process of the end of the Cold War, President George H. W. Bush announced that the United States, as a “European power,” would maintain significant military forces in Europe as long as its allies desire U.S. presence as part of a common security effort. This image of the U.S. at the Cold War’s demise might contradict its classical self-image in the context of U.S.-European relations. Traditionally, the U.S. took measures to avoid power politics on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. This paper explores why the U.S. decided to engage in the future of Europe, revealing its image as a “European power.” To this aim, first, this paper classifies theories of U.S. foreign policy into four types: 1) primacy, 2) isolationism, 3) offshore balancing, and 4) selective engagement. Furthermore, it examines as a case study the Bush administration’s foreign policy toward Europe on the basis of declassified primary materials located at the Presidential Library in Texas, memoirs by the former officials, and secondary sources. In this section, the way the U.S. managed the “German Question” at that time in collaboration with neighboring countries including the Soviet Union will be investigated. From 1989 to 1990, many in Europe were concerned about the scenario that the unified Germany became militarily and economically powerful, followed by a European imbalance of power. In this context, many neighbors in Europe, including the Soviet Union, welcomed U.S. military presence in the future of Europe as a “stabilizer.”</p><p>This story provides us with an answer to the question why the U.S. redefined its self-image as a “European power” at the ending of the Cold War. The Bush administration followed the cooperative principle in both areas of the bilateral U.S.-Soviet relationships and the Western alliance. The I-I.S. tried to treat the exhausted Soviets as still “superpower” to avoid political crisis that would lead to subversion of the Gorbachev-Ied Soviets regime. In terms of Atlantic relations, the U.S. always sought its strong leadership within the alliance to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) solidarity at the time of turbulence. President Bush and his national security advisor Brent Scowcroft recognized that the drastic development in Europe would lead to European imbalance of power as shared by many countries in the continent. To avoid this scenario, the U.S. adamantly denied the return to isolationism, and as a “stabilizer” in new European order, it decided to continue to maintain significant military forces. U.S. military presence never retreated offshore.</p><p>In sum, when Germany unified and Europe transformed, the U.S. employed the strategy of selective engagement in new European order. The reason the U.S. redefined itself as a “European power” is to show the denial of isolationism and the continuation of stationing significant military forces to manage the European balance of power in the post-Cold war era.</p>