This paper tries to investigate the three Shanghai uprisings, which formed one aspect of the climax of the National Revolution, while focusing on some problems of urban revolution. This article is broadly divided into the two following themes. The first is the problem of success and failure of the Shanghai uprisings, and the second is the problem of the strategy and tactics used by the Chinese Communist Party which fully committed itself to the cause. With regard to the first theme, the questions of how the epoch-making civil revolution of the urban masses won victory, why that became the impetus for the coup d'etat of 12 april (ssu yi-erh 四･一二), and finally why it collapsed after a short period, are examined. With regard to the second theme, the hypothesis is examined in various ways whether the commitment of the Chinese Communist Central Committee under Ch'en Tu-hsiu 陳獨秀 to the three uprisings didn't exist as a real alternative within the Chinese Revolution, although it was never actualized. I take the following approaches towards these themes. I. A comparative investigation of the three uprisings. The first, second and third Shanghai uprisings differed considerably in content. Moreover, the first one differed also from the second and third one in character and revolutionary vision. The third one was carried out under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party which used tactics of its own. But the attainment of the Chinese Communist Party's target of establishing a civil government in Shanghai (the ad hoc civil government) lead to the definite division within the ranks of the National Revolution. II. The liberation of Shanghai and the third uprising. The Shanghai uprisings were not isolated from the development of the Northern Expedition and the National Revolution, but they formed a corner of the conquest in the area of Chiang-su and Che-chiang (Chiang-che 江浙). But there existed a strong disagreement between the left-wing in Wuhan and Chiang Chieh-shih 蔣介石 of the right-wing, about the strategy for the conquest of this area (with the liberation of Shanghai and Nanking as its center). Originally it was the strategy of the right-wing but, after the fall of Hangchow, the left-wing changed to the strategy of taking Shanghai and Nanking first, in accord with its target of preventing the Great Powers and the Chiang Chieh-shih-wing from getting too close to each other. Consequently, the third Shanghai uprising became a part of this strategy. III. The problem of capital and labor in Shanghai and the revolutionary strategy. The Shanghai uprisings were carried out as an united front of the civil population of Shanghai, but at the center of the social situation of Shanghai in that time there existed a special labor-capital relationship. "Special" means that there were mutual relationships between the two which were not confined to purely class antagonism. The energetic devotion of Ch'en Tu-hsiu has been criticised by earlier authors as a "Shanghai-first" -policy or as right-wing opportunism. Such criticisms were made mainly from the point of view which considers democratic dictatorship of laborers and peasants, or a soviet as the supreme ideal. But if we take into consideration the special conditions in the biggest modern trading and industrial city of a semicolonized and semifeudal China, then we must conclude that such an evaluation is not necessarily right, and I think we have to reconsider the collapse of the Shanghai Revolution from a much broader point of view.