Mahābhāṣya ad P1.3.1研究(5)

DOI 機関リポジトリ Web Site オープンアクセス

書誌事項

タイトル別名
  • A STUDY OF THE MAHĀBHĀṢYA AD P1. 3. 1 (5)
  • Mahabhasya ad P1.3.1研究-5-
  • Mahabhasya ad P1.3.1 ケンキュウ 5

この論文をさがす

説明

SYNOPSIS (5) 1.4.1.1. [Question] The question is asked: What is an action? Behind this question lies an idea that an action (kriyā) is not perceived as a separate entity from a substance (dravya). 1.4.1.2.1. [Answer] The answer is given by means of enumerating some synonymous terms for 'kriya.' 1.4.1.2.2. [Objection] This manner of answering confirms that an action cannot be perceived directly. 1.4.1.3.1. [Answer to the objection] An action is absolutely not visible since it is the mentally constructed complex, the constituent action-moments of which occur in sequence, no sooner arising than they pass. It can only be known through inference (anumānagamya). 1.4.1.3.2. [Question] The question is raised: What inference is it that one might resort to to know an action? 1.4.1.3.3. [Answer] i) Inference of the difference of an action from a substance (dravyavyatireka): On condition that all participants in an action (sādhana-s) are present, sometimes one rightly says pacati ('he is cooking'), and sometimes one does not have this. One reasons as follows: The speech unit pacati has for its referent a different entity from the participants. What is referred to by pacati, that is, an action, is different from a substance. An item referring to a substance cannot be called dhātu owing to the distinction between an action and a substance. In this respect, what is ascertained by this inference is of significance for the definitional rule for the term dhātu: kriyāvacano dhātuḥ. ii.a) Inference of an action from the use of the verb form like pacati (śabdaprayoga): That, as a consequence of whose being one rightly says pacati, is an action. ii.b) Inference of an action from a spatial movement (deśāntaraprāpti): That, on account of which someone like Devadatta is first in one place and then in another place, is an action. According to Patañjali, an action has the cause-effect relation to the use of the verb form and to movement, which enables one to infer an action from these. With him, actions are inferred from their results. Of these two types of inference, Patañjali considers the latter to be preferable, for the reason that the use of the verb form pacati may take place even when what is supposed to be its cause, that is, an action of cooking, is not present in reality. One may say that a result such as reaching another place does not occur without its cause being present. (To be continued.)

収録刊行物

詳細情報 詳細情報について

問題の指摘

ページトップへ