1997年韓国金融危機の政治的要因 : 与野党の親財閥連合を中心に

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タイトル別名
  • The Pro-Chaebol Bipartisan Coalition and the 1997 Korean Financial Crisis
  • 1997ネン カンコク キンユウ キキ ノ セイジテキ ヨウイン : ヨヤトウ ノ シン ザイバツ レンゴウ オ チュウシン ニ

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抄録

What was the cause of Korea’s financial crisis of 1997 ? Many scholars have already proposed several answers. One such answer emphasizes the international factor, which is the role of international financial panic in the latter half of 1997 as an essential element. According to this argument, the panic in the international investment community resulted in the withdrawal of large-scale foreign capital from Korean financial institutions within a very short period of time. This sudden withdrawal finally caused the Korean financial crisis in 1997. This argument explains the comprehensive mechanism of the Asian financial crisis, which includes the Korean financial crisis. However, it does not explain the particular cause of the Korean financial crisis in 1997. Another explanation, on the contrary, attributes the cause of the 1997 Korean financial crisis to domestic factors. The crucial element is in fact, the vulnerability of Korean financial institutions to the international financial panic that had resulted from Korean financial institutions’ moral hazard. This argument explains the particular cause of the Korean financial crisis. However, it does not explain the cause of Korean financial institutions’ moral hazard, which resulted in their vulnerability to the international financial panic in the latter half of 1997. In order to explain the cause of the Korean financial crisis of 1997, we should clarify the cause of the Korean financial institutions’ moral hazard. About ten years before the crisis, Korea was democratized and the Kim Yong-sam administration, which came into power in 1993, had actively promoted the financial market liberalization to liquidate the developmental model indicating the close relationship among the government, financial institutions and Chaebols. However, a problem remained: In spite of the democratization of Korea and the Kim Yong-sam government’s liberalization of the Korean financial market, why was the Korean financial institutions’ moral hazard not appropriately regulated? 326 （3　27） This study proposes the following answer : By regional antagonism in Korean elections, which appeared in parallel with the democratization of Korea, the pro-Chaebol bipartisan coalition has dominated the National Assembly, thereby distorting the Kim Yong-sam government’s financial market liberalization and allowing moral hazard among politicians, financial institutions, and Chaebols to persistently endure until the Korean financial crisis of 1997.

収録刊行物

  • 一橋法学

    一橋法学 13 (1), 109-144, 2014-03-10

    一橋大学大学院法学研究科

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