Mayor term as a determinant of municipality budget

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  • 市町村予算決定要因としての首長任期

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Abstract

This paper investigates behavior of multi-term elected officials. Based on the tenure-ability linkage, long-serving, multi-term incumbents are hypothesized to have incentives to increase public resources under their control. This hypothesis is tested with budget data of municipalities in Japan. Results of regression analysis are consistent with the hypotheses regarding incentives of multi-term incumbents. Incumbent's additional term increases the municipality's expenditure per capita by 1.64% - 1.74% over the municipalities' average. This finding constitutes a significant policy implication in favor of adoption of term limits, since public policies under long-serving incumbents are biased to the direction of excessive presence of government activities

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