Optimization of Risk Chain-based Defense Analysis Model in Cyber-physical Space

大山 慎雄, Oyama Yoshio

doi:10.15002/00023957

There is a complex relationship between the risk of information leakage and countermeasures in an organization. For information leakage risk, there is a chain of risk events due to the coordination of organizations, and for risk countermeasures, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of countermeasures because the impact of implementation extends to multiple risk events. Therefore, in an environment with many devices, it is difficult to detect incidents and determine the management and monitoring points for incident response, and it is considered problematic that the understanding of risks and the optimization of protective measures are performed empirically. In addition, risk analysis and evaluation are often conducted separately for cyberspace and physical space, which does not necessarily correspond to the reality of intertwining these two areas. In this study, we propose an optimization method for the control analysis model by integrating cyberspace and physical space, representing these risk chains in a state transition diagram, and using an analysis method for our previous model to visualize the results of risk countermeasures. In this paper, we propose an optimization method for the control analysis model based on our previous research model, which is based on the concept of the critical path. We verify and confirm that this method enables us to respond to changes in the risk situation that occur in reality, and to optimize the protection against related risks and to optimize the protection cost based on the concept of the critical path.

Optimization of Risk Chain-based Defense Analysis Model in Cyber-physical Space

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