From the Origin of Morality to the Evolutionary Ethics, part II : Reductionism in the Normative Ethics

In this part II, we aim at constructing a reductionistic theory of normative ethics, drawing on the results of part I, in the spirit of the Darwinian theory on the origin of morality. First, I wish to make clear what I mean by "reductionism" in normative ethics. (1) It is concerned with the nature of moral values or moral norms, and it asserts that these can be reduced to non-moral values and other conditions. (2) It does not assert that moral values or norms can be reduced to factual statements; we regard the distinction between description and prescription as basic, and norms and values belong to the latter. (3) And it aims at showing not only that moral values can be reduced to non-moral values, but also how that reduction can be accomplished. Our reductionism tries to depend on scientific theories and findings on human nature on the one hand, and tries to avoid any assumptions which appeal to special or irreducible character of morality, on the other. Thus the Kantian position which characterizes moral values by referring to Reason's Freedom and distinguishes them from satisfaction of mere preferences, is clearly contrary to our reductionism. But what are the merits of reductionism in normative ethics? First, it is compatible with scientific and empirical findings about human nature, and it can directly appeal to what we feel and experience; non-reductionism either places morality beyond the realm of our empirical knowledge, or separates morality from our animal nature. Secondly, as a consequence of the first, we can construct a normative theory, on reductionism, in terms of such factors as appearing in our actual deliberation or decision in practical matters : preferences, feelings, or inclinations together with some other conditions. Since the Darwinian account of morality does not need any super-natural elements, normative ethics should not appeal to any such, either. And thirdly, reductionism on the basis of our preferences (including our tendencies to aim at personal ideals or emotional tendencies) can easily connect normative ethics with what we actually do, and provide motivations for our behavior; normative ethics which lacks this connection is useless and pointless. As a preliminary analysis, we examine some of the characterizations of morality in moral philosophy (such as Baier's or Hare's), and point out that there is a considerable gap between these and what we actually observe in our 'moral behavior or discourse'; the gap mainly consists in the normative elements in the philosopher's characterization, and the philosopher often requires too much universality for morality. However, the mere presence of normative elements does not make reductionism impossible; reductionism fails only if we are forced to assume moral norms which cannot be reduced to non-moral values. Thus our preliminary analysis suggests the following tasks for reductionism : (1) we have to ascertain the gap between our morality as it is and morality as it ought to be; and (2) we have to analyze the basic factors and normative judgments contained in the latter; further, (3) we have to show how these judgments can be justified; and finally, (4) we have to show that these factors, as well as the basis of the justification, are reducible to non-moral factors and conditions. (To be continued.)