The Japanese Army and its policy towards the League of Nations

This paper analyzes the process of the political transformation that took place within the Japanese Imperial Army by examining its policy towards the League of Nations. While the research to date insists on the Army's hardline stand towards the League, the LoN program is noteworthy for its presence in Japan’s diplomacy towards Europe, based on the issue of armaments during normalcy and military action in emergency situations.<br> Therefore, the author has chosen to reconstruct armament and diplomatic policy of the early Showa Era, focusing on the Geneva Disarmament Conference and the Manchurian Incident. in the hope of clarifying the process by which the possibility of disarmament was lost and the reappearance of possible alliance between Japan and France.<br> The Army’s LoN agenda was characterized by the intent to evade disarmament and the need for international cooperation, from which evolved the decision to not engage in European international politics. In preparations for the Geneva Disarmament Conference, domestic conflicts between the government and the Army and within the Army were shelved, in favor of a united front of non-involvement in Europe, while leaving open the possibility of cooperation with the LoN. However, when the conference opened, exposing its hardships, and at the same time the issue of the Manchurian Incident became problematic at LoN, doubts arose within the Army about the success of disarmament, and the nucleus of its LoN agenda shifted to responding to the Manchurian Incident, which floated the idea of alliance with France as one possibility. When the alliance gesture failed, Japan decided to withdraw from the League, and the army became apathetic about disarmament, thus scuttling the LoN program.<br> For the Army, the League of Nations had become an external force restraining its political transformation, and freedom from such constraints allowed the focus on armaments to shift from reduction to expansion, while giving birth to a way of thinking and acting which promised to re-enervate the possibility of political alliance with France.