選挙制度と経済政策

DOI

Abstract

<p>The main purpose of this paper is to focus on the economic distortion caused by the malapportionment of representatives and to search for a way to eradicate such distortion. An interesting conclusion is that amendment of the apportionment of representatives is desirable even for the people who will end up with fewer representatives. This paper suggests that people who protect their benefits by political pressure may increase their own welfare level by unilaterally throwing away their excess political power. This chapter also suggests that promoting the movement of people from subsidized agricultural areas to cities will raise welfare levels. This is different from the “common sense view” in Japan. However, if we postulate that the low labor productivity of Japanese agriculture is attributable to overpopulation in rural areas. And that congestion in city areas reflects the scarcity of social capital (i.e. infrastructure financed by government), it may not seem so strange.</p>

Journal

  • Public Policy

    Public Policy 2000 (0), 2000-1-016-, 2000

    Public Policy Studies Association Japan

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