-
- 稲荷森 輝一
- 北海道大学大学院文学院; 人間知×脳×AI研究教育センター; 日本学術振興会
抄録
This study aimed to present a novel explanation for the perplexing nature of moral intuition regarding abstract and concrete descriptions of deterministic actions. Nichols and Knobe (2007) have found that, when deterministic actions are described concretely, most people exhibit compatibilist responses. Conversely, when deterministic actions are described abstractly, most people exhibit incompatibilist responses. The prevailing explanation for this phenomenon is that one of the two responses is an error. However, this study argues that this phenomenon can be understood as a consequence of normal operation of the mechanism that generates moral intuition. The focus is on Björnsson’s Explanation Hypothesis (Björnsson & Persson, 2012, 2013; Björnsson, 2015), which posits that differences in explanations provided for deterministic actions in different cases account for the discrepancy in intuition between concrete and abstract cases. This study reinterpreted this proposal by focusing on how actions were represented in concrete and abstract cases and presented a new theory, which is the explanation-representation hypothesis. This theory accounts for both compatibilist and incompatibilist intuition without relying on error accounts.
収録刊行物
-
- Contemporary and Applied Philosophy
-
Contemporary and Applied Philosophy 15 110-134, 2024-04-10
応用哲学会
- Tweet
詳細情報 詳細情報について
-
- CRID
- 1390300058784387712
-
- DOI
- 10.14989/287557
-
- HANDLE
- 2433/287557
-
- ISSN
- 18834329
-
- 本文言語コード
- ja
-
- データソース種別
-
- JaLC
- IRDB
-
- 抄録ライセンスフラグ
- 使用可