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- Kalashnikov Vyacheslav V.
- Tecnológico de Monterrey (ITESM) Central Economics & Mathematics Institute (CEMI), Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) Sumy State University
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- Bulavsky Vladimir A.
- Central Economics & Mathematics Institute (CEMI), Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS)
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- Kalashnykova Nataliya I.
- Sumy State University Department of Physics & Maths (FCFM), Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León (UANL)
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- Watada Junzo
- Graduate School of Information, Production and Systems, Waseda University
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- Hernández-Rodríguez Diego de Jesús
- Department of Physics & Maths (FCFM), Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León (UANL)
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説明
<p>In this paper, a model of mixed oligopoly with conjectured variations equilibrium (CVE) is examined, in which one of the agents maximizes a convex combination of its net profit with the domestic social surplus. The agents’ conjectures concern the price variations, which depend on the variations in their production outputs. Using the established existence and uniqueness results for the CVE (the exterior equilibrium) for any fixed set of feasible conjectures, the notion of the interior equilibrium is introduced by developing a conjecture consistency criterion. Then, the existence theorem for the interior equilibrium (defined as a CVE state with consistent conjectures) is proven. When the convex combination coefficient tends to 1 (thus transforming the model into the mixed oligopoly in its extreme form), two trends are apparent. First, for private companies, the equilibrium with consistent conjectures becomes more proficient than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Second, there exists a (unique) value of the convex combination coefficient such that the private agent’s aggregate profit is the same in both the above-mentioned equilibria, which makes subsidies to producers or consumers unnecessary.</p>
収録刊行物
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- Journal of Advanced Computational Intelligence and Intelligent Informatics
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Journal of Advanced Computational Intelligence and Intelligent Informatics 18 (6), 971-984, 2014-11-20
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390564238104230528
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- NII論文ID
- 130007673163
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- NII書誌ID
- AA12042502
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- ISSN
- 18838014
- 13430130
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- NDL書誌ID
- 025970362
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- データソース種別
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- JaLC
- NDL
- Crossref
- CiNii Articles
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- 抄録ライセンスフラグ
- 使用不可