発展途上国における教育の地方分権化とSchool-Based Management

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タイトル別名
  • School-Based Management and Decentralization of Education Sectors in Developing Countries
  • 発展途上国における教育の地方分権化とSchool-Based Management--セネガルにおける学校運営委員会のインセンティブ構造
  • ハッテン トジョウコク ニ オケル キョウイク ノ チホウ ブンケンカ ト School Based Management セネガル ニ オケル ガッコウ ウンエイ イインカイ ノ インセンティブ コウゾウ
  • —Incentive Structure of School Management Committees in Senegal—
  • ―セネガルにおける学校運営委員会のインセンティブ構造―

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<p>This paper attempts to present an analytic framework based on the Principal-Agent Model concerning the allocation of authority between a Ministry of Education (Principal) and a School Management Committee (Agent) for designing an optimal decentralized education system in a developing country, utilizing a case study of the Education System in Senegal.</p><p>This article analyses a trade-off between a Principal's monitoring effort and an Agent's incentives. In terms of the Contract Theory, the monitoring effort of Ministries, minimizing the information disparity between the Principals and the Agents, discourages the incentives of School Management Committees to improve their school environment. This does not mean, however, there is a need to limit an increase of a Ministry's effort for encouraging an Agent's incentives because the effort level of the Principal (the Ministry) tends to be lower than the necessary level in terms of maximizing the total social benefit. Therefore, it is desirable for the Ministry to exert efforts to create an encouraging environment for promoting the School Management Committee's incentives rather than to strengthen its efforts of monitoring in order to achieve its policy goals. Under these conditions, the Ministry's efforts of monitoring would be justified only if supportive guidance for school activities is given by inspectors to School Management Committees or if the conflicts of interest of the both sides are minimized.</p><p>Another finding of this study is that under decentralization, the provision of a school grant would enhance the incentives of the School Management Committee but would have no effect on the effort of the Ministry of Education. In this context, an interesting implication is that the provision of a large amount of school grants beyond the community's capacity may have a negative effect on the allocation of efforts of the School Management Committee between its original activities without a grant and school projects with a grant.</p>

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