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- Kurokawa Yoshinori
- Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba
説明
<p>We develop a simple model of competition policies and trade, where fixed costs are shared within a cartel. The closed economy model shows that entry deregulation can increase the skill premium by increasing firm numbers and decreasing firm size, while an antitrust policy has the opposite effects. The numerical example with two asymmetric countries shows that entry deregulation and antitrust policy in one country, respectively, can increase and decrease the skill premia in both countries; however, the domestic skill premium is changed by a greater percentage than the foreign one. Available U.S. data show that our model seems empirically relevant.</p><p>JEL Classifications: F12, F16, J31, L13, L41, L51</p>
収録刊行物
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- The International Economy
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The International Economy 23 (0), 145-162, 2020
日本国際経済学会
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詳細情報 詳細情報について
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- CRID
- 1390567901495908736
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- NII論文ID
- 130007950315
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- ISSN
- 18844367
- 21866074
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- 本文言語コード
- en
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- データソース種別
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- JaLC
- Crossref
- CiNii Articles
- OpenAIRE
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- 抄録ライセンスフラグ
- 使用不可