John McDowell’s “Spaces of reasons” and problems of legal meta-axiology

ITO Katsuhiko

doi:10.11205/jalp.2007.0_181

It seems that current jurisprudential discussions neglect legal meta-axiology (meta-ethics). For example, when we claim to be “discussing the value reasonably” in normative theory of Justice, we don’t know “what is “reasonable””. Normative theory in current discussions faces the problems of justification of theory. I propose that we should focus on legal meta-axiology (meta-ethics) to solve this problem, and this paper explains John McDowell’s meta-ethical theory and its philosophical background. McDowell criticized J. L. Mackie’s and Simon Blaclburn’s projectism through arguments on secondary quality and thick ethical concepts. Particularly, McDowell doubted the Cartesian view which is the background of their meta-ethical theory. McDowell’s meta-ethics position is based on his philosophical claim “Spaces of reasons” and criticism of “Myth of the given”. In his view, we do not receive experience that is given; we receive experience thorough concepts and beliefs. These concepts construct complex structure of justification, which McDowell called “Spaces of reasons” In my view, McDowell’s discussions is similar to significance of jurisprudential problems such as : (1) the problem of legal value, (2) critical reconsideration of the dichotonomy of fact/value, (3) analysis of “reason”, and (4) practical reason and reasoning.

John McDowell’s “Spaces of reasons” and problems of legal meta-axiology

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