Hilary Putnamʼs Changes in Realism and the Concept of Truth

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  • ヒラリー・パトナムの実在論の変遷と真理の概念
  • ヒラリー ・ パトナム ノ ジツザイロン ノ ヘンセン ト シンリ ノ ガイネン

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Abstract

 According to the contextualism of knowledge, the statement “I donʼt know that I have hands”is true if it is asserted on the basis of a high level of cognitive standards by skeptics. However, the statement is false if it is asserted on the basis of a low level of cognitive standards in everyday conversation. In other words, truth is relative to the context of an utterance. As a preparatory step in assessing this contextualism, this paper focuses on a discussion of Hilary Putnamʼs realism. Putnam has been discussing truth in relation to realism for many years and has shifted his own perspective from metaphysical to natural realism through internal realism. Natural realism, in particular, is important. Putnam paraphrases “natural realism” as “natural realism of the common man” or “commonsense realism.” In other words, natural realism is realism from the perspective of our everyday language, and truth is discussed in relation to this realism. In these respects, it is worthwhile to refer to Putnamʼs discussion of realism and truth before considering contextualism. Therefore, in this study, first, by tracing the development of Putnamʼs realism, I have identified the motivations for his changing realism, the perspectives implicitly assumed in this development, and what we should learn from natural realism. Second, based on Putnamʼs consideration, I discuss what can be said about truth from the aspect of everyday language.

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