総合評価落札方式オークションの均衡入札 : 除算方式評価の場合

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  • Equilibrium Bidding Behavior in Scoring Auctions: the Case of Value-for-Money Evaluation
  • ソウゴウ ヒョウカ ラクサツ ホウシキ オークション ノ キンコウ ニュウサツ ジョサン ホウシキ ヒョウカ ノ バアイ

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I study the equilibrium bidding behavior in procurement scoring auctions in which each bid is evaluated according to the value-for-money(quality-price ratio). In particular, I consider an auction with n bidders, each of whom receives a cost parameter for quality provision from a symmetric, independent uniform distribution, then decides whether to participate the auction by paying an entry fee, and bids a quality-price pair upon entering. The bidder with the highest value-for money experts the project with the promised quality, and receives the bidded price. I derive an equilibrium in which the probability of winning increase as the cost parameter becomes more efficient. However, this evaluation method implies a little odd bidding behavior: the equilibrium price and quality exhibit U-shape curves with respect to the cost parameter.

収録刊行物

  • 経済科学

    経済科学 57 (4), 149-157, 2010-03-25

    名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科

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