Summary of the ʻStudy of Wittgensteinʼs On Certaintyʼ

DOI IR HANDLE Web Site Open Access

Bibliographic Information

Other Title
  • ウィトゲンシュタインの「確実性」について
  • ウィトゲンシュタイン ノ 「 カクジツセイ 」 ニ ツイテ

Search this article

Abstract

Certainty is one of the themes which Wittgenstein was interested in. His thoughts are left in the form of notes named On Certainty. He has put down in it a series of remarks on the usage of such words as ʻknowledgeʼ, ʻdoubtʼ, ʻbeliefʼ, ʻcertaintyʼ, etc. and the foundation of language-games related to them. I try in this paper to illuminate how the ordinary language-games about knowledge, doubt, belief, etc. relate with ʻunshakeable things (Moore-type propositions (Marie McGinn), hinges (Danièle Moyal-Sharrock))ʼ. Certainty belongs to ʻunshakeable thingsʼ that underlie all our ordinary language-games. Knowledge and certainty belong to different layers of our epistemic capacities (different categories). McGinn showed that Moore-type propositions can not be used in epistemic context. Moyal-Sharrock showed that hinges are rules of grammar and that they can manifest themselves only in what we say and do. But they could not definitely distinguish the certainty of the ʻunshakeable thingsʼ from their causes.

Journal

Keywords

Details 詳細情報について

Report a problem

Back to top