クリプキの 信念のパズル に対する批判 通常 という概念をめぐって

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  • <研究論文(原著論文)>クリプキの「信念のパズル」に対する批判 --「通常」という概念をめぐって--

Description

In this paper, I suggest that, since Kripke's Puzzle about Belief involves a tendentious conception of the terms "normal, " "standard" or alike, it cannot be qualified as a genuine philosophical puzzle that every philosopher should attempt to solve. First, I explain the historical background of and appropriately reformulate the Puzzle about Belief. Next, I overview existing solutions and introduce the details of some of them. However, I suggest that Kripke would not admit that any of these "solutions" really solve the Puzzle, because, according to him, none of the existing proposals would be consistent with the "normal" practice of belief ascription (e.g., Kripke would reject some solutions because they violate the Translation Principle that the "standard" speakers must obey). I argue that Kripke's view involves a commitment toward a biased use of terms like "normal" or "standard." Therefore, if we refute his conception of "normal" or "standard" in an appropriate way, we can avoid the Puzzle about Belief.

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Details 詳細情報について

  • CRID
    1390572174710144640
  • NII Article ID
    120005359354
  • DOI
    10.14989/180275
  • HANDLE
    2433/180275
  • ISSN
    18834329
  • Text Lang
    ja
  • Data Source
    • JaLC
    • IRDB
    • CiNii Articles
    • OpenAIRE
  • Abstract License Flag
    Allowed

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