Estimating Cartel Behavior: The Case of the Cement Cartel in Hokkaido

DOI HANDLE Web Site Open Access

Bibliographic Information

Other Title
  • カルテル行動の推定 : 北海道セメントカルテル事件
  • カルテル コウドウ ノ スイテイ : ホッカイドウ セメントカルテル ジケン

Search this article

Abstract

This paper empirically studies the behavior of an illegal cartel. Based on the case of the Japanese cement industry cartel in the Hokkaido prefecture,the paper reached the following two conclusions. First,a widely used specification test does not support the fully collusive pricing behavior. Second,on examining,the behavior of the cartel,it was found that the cartel gradually increased prices and then gradually reduced prices after reaching the highest level of price. This pricing dynamic is consistent with illegal cartel theory prediction.

Journal

  • 経済研究

    経済研究 71 (1), 35-48, 2020-01-25

    岩波書店

Related Projects

See more

Details 詳細情報について

Report a problem

Back to top