The present paper aims at explaining the content of Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation and criticizing what I call Quine's behavioristic physicalism which I claim is the pillar of Quine's thesis. First of all, I explain that Quine's thesis is not just an epistemological but rahter ontological thesis. As Quine's reply to Chomsky's criticism shows, Qune's thesis ultimately claims the absence of the fact of the matter for theory of translation and for theory of meaning. In other words, according to the thesis, there is no definite structure of reality which provides the final sentence on the truthvalue of competing theories of translation and of meaning. Theories of translation and of meaning are not concerned with reality, and hence do not deserve the title of scientific inquiry, although they may be perfectly respectable practical inquiries. So, Quine claims. Secondly, I explain the content of Quine's physicalism which constitutes his idea of the reality. Thirdly, I make clear the impotant role played by Quine's behaviorism in his thesis of the indterminacy. Quine's behaviorism or, more exactly, his behavioristic understanding of language, consists of the idea that because all of us learn language via behavior under publicly observable circumstances, that which we say about language meaningfully must be said in or "cashed in" behavioristic terms. Quine's behavioristic concept of language, which is manifested in the first sentence in his preface to "Word And Object", provides the final reason for his refusal of the factuality to theories of translation and of meaning. On the basis of such an understanding of the theoretical underpinningof Quine's thesis, I argue that Quine makes too much out of his behavioristic understanding of language with the result that his behaviorism becomes not quite consistent with his physicalism, or at least that Quine does not provide sufficient reason for the claim that from his correct idea of the important role played in our language acquisition by behavior in publicly observable circumstances we must necessarily accept his arguably far-fetched conclusion. I suggest the direction which Quine could take in which Quine's physicalism could accomodate his behavioristic insight without being distorted by it. Finally, I briefly mention the presence of the tension between Quine' thesis of the indeterminacy of translation and physicalism and his recognition of the legitimacy of normative pistemology, in other words between Quine's physicalism , behavioristic or not, and hise idea of the epistemological enterprise as a whole.