<研究論文(原著論文)>隠喩という特等席 --非認知主義を擁護する--

In this paper, I propose a view that metaphors show the special seats to the hearer, to overcome problems that noncognitivism on metaphor is alleged to have. The noncognitivist view consists of two theses. First, metaphors have no metaphorical meaning: if we understand “meaning” as speaker meaning, meaning grasped through Gricean intention recognition or Lewisian update of the conversational scoreboard, there is no metaphorical meaning. Second, we are prompted by metaphors to take a perspective: metaphors invite us to see one thing as another, thereby evoking nonpropositional metaphorical effects. Noncognitivism is attractive because metaphors seem to have significantly nonpropositional aspects such as imagination, emotion, or mood and noncognitivism affords prima facie good explanations for such aspects. However, noncognitivism has a weak point: it does not fit some situations in which we communicate metaphorically. For example, we often misunderstand or deny metaphors, but noncognitivism seems to fail to explain these situations. By contrast, I argue that we can cope better with these problems if we count a perspective that metaphors present as the special seat. According to this proposal, the speaker or writer, on the one hand, sets the perspective as the special seat for their own view about subjects of metaphor in the light of contexts. On the other hand, if the seat is set properly, the hearer or reader is expected to get the most similar view to the speaker or writer's from that seat. We can draw two key ideas from this picture: first, the perspective that metaphors present is privileged, and second, the hearer or reader can report retrospectively what they saw from the metaphorical special seat in propositional expression. These two ideas, the privilege of the metaphorical special seat and retrospective propositional reports, are keys to overcoming the weak point of noncognitivism.